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1 The continental – German for the most past – strand of classical hermeneutics and the
typically  Anglo-Saxon school  of  American  pragmatism have  more  than  one  point  in
common, something which only some contemporary critics – the most famous of which is
certainly Rorty – have noticed. To be honest, these possible convergences are considered
with suspicion, maybe due to the extreme divergence of the two schools of thought that
they refer to.  The methods,  the disciplinary orientations,  the languages,  the cultural
environments in which the respective representatives work are, in fact, too distant the
one from the other.
2 Nevertheless,  there  is  a  basic  shared  inspiration  between  the  two  philosophical
perspectives that is recognisable and comparable under many respects.1 Be this shared
inspiration a way of thinking common to a great part of twentieth century thought; or be
it instead an actual consonance of perspectives, as a matter of fact hermeneutics and
pragmatism resonate together, often echoing each other when reflecting on themes like
truth, objectivity, belief, and value. This common intonation is the object of this article,
thus  introducing  one  of  the  themes  that  characterize  the  aims  of  this  journal:  the
comparison of the different philosophical traditions developed on the two opposite sides
of the Atlantic.2
3 I will start simply with some quotations:
“Of what alone can knowledge consist? – “Interpretation”: The introduction of sense
into things, not ‘explanation’ (in the majority of the cases a new interpretation of
an old  interpretation which has  grown incomprehensible and has  become little
more than a mere sign). There is no such thing as an established fact, everything
fluctuates, everything is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all things
are our opinions.”3 (WP 604)
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“In opposition to Positivism, which halts at phenomena and says, ‘These are only
facts and nothing more,’ I would say: No, facts are precisely what is lacking, all that
exists consists of interpretations.  We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’:  it  may
even  be  nonsense  to  desire  to  do  such  a  thing.  […]  To  the  extent  to  which
knowledge has any sense at all, the world is knowable: but it may be interpreted
differently, it has not one sense behind it, but hundreds of senses. – ‘Perspectivity’.”
(WP 481)
“Beliefs  are  themselves  parts  of  the  sum  total  of  the  world’s  experience,  and
become matter, therefore, for the next day’s funding operations […] In the realm of
truth- processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs provisionally.
But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do so, they bring into sight or into
existence new facts which re-determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil
and ball of truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths emerge
from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to them; which facts again
create or reveal new truths (the word is indifferent) and so on indefinitely. The
‘facts’ themselves meanwhile are not true. They simply are. Truth is the function of
the beliefs that start and terminate among them […] What we say about reality thus
depends on the perspective into which we throw it.” (P 107-8)4
4 Truth and perspective: these are essentially the themes at stake. The issue that troubled
James – and that,  we should add, did not trouble Peirce too much, since his interest
focused on logical meaning – is actually truth or, to use a Nietzschean expression, will to
truth. In other words, the theme is thus declined: which function has truth in our lives?
Why do we consider to know and to know the truth better than not to know? I will focus –




5 Let us start from the statement – taken from one of his most important works – that
James soberly proposes in the previous quotation, according to which truth is circular
and perspectival and reality coincides with the totality of beliefs that denote it as such. As
it  is  easy  to  notice,  there  are  here  extraordinary  assonances  with  the  Nietzschean
vituperated expression –  blamed by many as  relativism and nihilism –,  according to
which we live dazzled, persuaded of the existence of concrete “things in themselves,” the
“truth” of which it would be our task to look for. Certainly James does not reach the point
of saying that there are no facts, only interpretations; but we can also state with a high
degree of certainty that neither Nietzsche should be interpreted under the simplistic –
partly Idealist and partly Gascon – image apparently transpiring from The Will to power.5
To better penetrate Nietzsche’s thought let us take an example6 that Peirce and James
would have probably appreciated, since it comes from biology, the elective science in
mid-nineteenth century intellectual landscape, in which the two pragmatist friends were
educated. The example involves the universe of ticks, small and annoying animals that –
as it is known – react to only three sensible stimuli: light, warmth and smell. Every tick
stays on a branch, sometimes for years, attracted by a particularly well-lit place (first
fundamental index of their vital praxis); it stays there absolutely static and amorphous,
until an animal with a certain type of smell happens to walk below it. This is the second
sign of the ‘world’ to be perceived: an olfactory sign. A ‘world’ in the form of animal reek.
Once the tick has fallen on to the back of the mentioned beast, it tries to crawl to the
place least covered in fur in order to penetrate it: and here is the third stimulus that the
tick welcomes from the world, a tactile one. That is all: of a world bustling with colours,
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smells, forms, sounds, flavours, screams, events, and movements, the tick extracts three
things only: light, a certain smell, a certain temperature. The tick selects them, elevates
them to absolutes and it does not seem to see anything else of that which is ‘the world’ for
us. But is this a subtraction from or instead a perfection of the (biological) being? Is the
world of the tick the same as our own world? The great German naturalist Jacob von
Uexküll grasped this point with extreme acuteness: “we can no longer speak of the single
sun, shining in the sky, but must speak of thousands upon thousands of suns. […] The sun
that makes a swarm of gnats dance is not our sun but a gnat sun, which owes its existence
to the eye of the gnat.”7 Thus, it is not the same world seen from different points of view,
but a different world. Here is – in plain words – the reference to hermeneutic principles
based not on a trivial relativism or an interpretive subjectivism, but on the biological
functions  that  ground  the  cognitive  impulse.  As  many  authors  have  already
demonstrated,8 Nietzsche’s perspectivity is deeply rooted in a similar reasoning. In The
Will to Power we can read: “It is our need that interpret the world; our instincts and their
impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for power; each has its point of
view, which it would fain impose upon all the other instincts as their norm” (WP 481).
6 In other passages, Nietzsche clarifies that it is possible to define knowledge as truth only
by referring to the rigorously “biological and anthropocentric” reasons thanks to which
“every centre of power – and not man alone – constructs the rest of the world from its
point of view – that is to say measures it, feels it, and moulds it according to its degree of
strength,” that is to say assumes perspectives (WP 636). In this way, we are already far
from the “intellectualist” reading according to which perspective is an act of pure mental
apprehension that – from a certain point of view – contemplates the truth of things, and
this  apprehension  is  being  deemed  as  always  unavoidably  relative,  since  such  a
perspectival  glimpse  can  never  grasp  the  “being-in-itself”  in  its  wholeness.  This
relativism can be defined as “nostalgic”: it always maintains regret for the absolute that –
while existing somewhere – is inaccessible to the part. But here Nietzsche simply says:
each perspective is determined by our need, by our practical and physiological instincts,
and to live means to be “partial,” to be (in) perspective, without being able to be situated in
different perspectives, and even less in panoramic ones. In more explicit words: “The
things-in-itself  is  nonsense.  If  I  think  all  the  ‘relations,’  all  the  ‘qualities,’  all  the
‘activities’ of a thing, away, the thing itself does not remain: for the ‘thingness’ was only
invented fancifully by us to meet certain logical needs – that is to say, for the purposes of
definition and comprehension (in order to correlate that multitude of relations, qualities,
and activities)” (WP 558). It is only in this sense that there are no “facts”: if we delete the
difference between being and knowability – as also Peirce’s writings from 1868 attempted
to do – we do not have either facts, or – in a strict sense – perspectives on facts: “As if a
world could remain over, when the point of view is cancelled!” (WP 567).
7 If we make the real world disappear, the apparent world disappears also. Nietzsche is
very clear about this point: if we eliminate metaphysical dualisms, with the idea of “in-
itself” also the idea of “for me” disappears, that is, the opposition between absolute and
relative disappears (is the “poor” world of the tick experienced as lacking of anything?
That world is – in its poor relativity – absolutely perfect). Finally – Nietzsche states – a
shapeless flux appears to us as a “fact” only when we are able to give a meaning to it (WP
556); even the word “fact” refers to the concept of action, to something that is man-made,
produced. To talk of facts, of things in themselves is simply another interpretation, a
perspective amongst the many others through which we can look at the world.9
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8 This  position  is,  as  previously  mentioned,  represented  with  equal  incisiveness  –  but
maybe with more caution and some incoherence – in James’  writings.  In his seventh
conference,  titled  “Pragmatism and  Humanism”  –  perhaps  the  most  theoretical  and
radical of the eight that compose Pragmatism – James attacks Truth, this “perfect idol of
the  rationalistic  mind!”  (P 115),  clarifying  –  in  a  way  that  Nietzsche  would  have
appreciated – that the question: “Which is the truth?” is “irrelative to all conditions” for
any possible answer. It should not thus be considered as a real question, moved by a real
doubt (a genuinely irritating one, that has an influence on our lives – as Peirce argued).
Truth is always declined in the plural, it is not that which is in relation to something
existent,  “out there,” or to something that was,  but it  is that which is in relation to
something that still  does not exist,  that is  in formation.  “Philosophy has the natural
tendency to want that truth is facing backwards, according to James it looks in front of
us.”10 Thus truth “is not found, but manufactured” (ivi), not a discovery, but an invention;
facts  are,  indeed,  artifacts,  created,  produced  (P 143).  Truth  ripens,  as  a  fruit.  It  is
constantly constituting itself and proliferating, like a coral.
9 Moreover – following the formulation of Ferdinand Canning Schiller – James emphasises
that truths have to be conceived as “man-made products,” “abstract names for the results
[…] of a certain process” (P 117); or better, as something that evolves with the progressing
of  our  (individual  and communitarian)  life,  in  the same way as  biological  organisms
evolve. In a Darwinian fashion, concepts emerge, impose themselves, blossom and decay.
But if we can say this of truths, the same can be said of the so-called “facts”: the world is
plastic – James writes inspiring by Schiller’s humanism –, “it is what we make of it” (ivi).
No “thing-in-itself” exists, before us or without us. We produce as much “Reality” as we
can believe but we do not find it already out there (P 118). James could not have read the
notes  of  The  Will  to  Power,  but  he  would  have  certainly  agreed  with  the  following
statement by Nietzsche: “‘truth’ is not something which is present and which has to be
found and discovered; it is something which has to be created and which gives its name to a
process […]. To introduce truth is a processus in infinitum, an active determining – it is not a
process of becoming conscious of something, which in itself is fixed and determined”
(WP 552).  As  an aside note:  this  –  and nothing else than this  –  is  for  Nietzsche the
meaning of the will to power: to replace being with value (WP 55611), to stamp Being with
the character of Becoming (WP 617).
10 In many passages James does not hesitate, it is true, to define himself as an “empiricist”
and  to  underline  the  existence  of  sensible  fluxes,  stimulations  and  perceptions  that
invade us and that offer a resistance to our free creation of beliefs and opinions about
what is real and what is not. “‘Reality’ in general is what truths have to take account of”
(P 117), something independent from our will. James – exactly like Nietzsche – is not an
idealist. But these indistinct fluxes of material that invade us “are neither true nor false;
they simply are” (P 117). “That they are is undoubtedly beyond our control; but which we
attend to, note, and make emphatic in our conclusions depends on our own interests”
(P 118). For example – James writes – Waterloo pinpoints a Belgian location, with certain
features, undeniably existing there and now. But for an Englishman it means victory, for
a Frenchman it means defeat. For a European man it is there, with its geographically and
anthropologically well-analysable features, for a tick it will be a certain ground light, a
rugged and inhospitable territory. Which “fact” are we talking about?, Nietzsche would
then ask him. And for whom, if not for us and for our interpretive tools, can this be
defined a “fact”?
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11 Anyway, James again seems very close to these Nietzschean reflections in his conclusions:
“What we say about reality thus depends on the perspective into which we throw it. The
that of it is its own; but the what depends on the which; and the which depends on us”
(P 118). Maybe Nietzsche would object that even the that is a function of the what, and
that it does not “belong” to reality. But this scission of the being in event and meaning –
to use Carlo Sini’s words12 – is attested in a clearly tragic way since Nietzsche’s first
writings.  The frozen river of existence – as The Birth of  Tragedy (1872) claims – flows
horrendous and tumultuous: in order not to be reflected in its abyssal depth, we dress it
in  beautiful  shapes,  with  colourful  “[r]ubbish  and  gold  dust  of  unconscious  human
vanity.” Nevertheless, “[u]nderneath such flattering colours and repainted surfaces, we
must once again recognize the terrifying basic text of homo natura” (BGE 143).13 In other
words, Apollo is always one of Dionysus’ names and Dionysus cannot appear if not “in
figure.” But he is there, with the “that of its own” terrible and incomprehensible. We hear
the  echo  of  this  complementary  duality  in  James,  who  –  in  the  last  pages  of  the
conference – insists on the fact that it is not possible to deny that “All ‘homes’ are in
finite experience; finite experience as such is homeless.” There is a certain sensible flux,
but “what is true of it seems from first to last to be largely a matter of our own creation”
(P 122).
12 There is  thus a circularity – do we want to define it  as a hermeneutic circularity? –
between facts and beliefs, according to which human beings add constantly – through the
actions of their lives – facts to the brute matter of existence. This retroactively shapes the
interpretive forms themselves, redefining their contours. Matter could thus be conceived
of  à la  Peirce as the cohesive order of  our beliefs  – consolidated and made inert  by
common sense – that come to be solidified in the course of tradition. “Reality” is thus
continuously transformed by the beliefs and interpretations that lead us in actions, and
actions, practical or theoretical, produce facts that were not even conceivable as such
before.
13 If a reality independent from thought – that is from human action (P 118) – does not exist,
how can we be sure to grasp truth? James does not let this question frighten him and –
again – answers it in a surprisingly Nietzschean way: “We may glimpse [reality], but we
never grasp it;  what we grasp is always some substitute for it which previous human
thinking has peptinized and cooked for our consumption. If so vulgar an expression were
allowed us, we might say that wherever we find it, it has been already faked” (P 119-20). In
Nietzsche we can read: “‘Dissimulation’  increases in accordance with the rising order of
rank among organic beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be entirely absent. – There
power opposes power quite roughly – ruse begins in the organic world; plants are already
masters of it. […] Before ‘thought’ is possible, ‘fancy’ must first have done its work; the
picturing of identical cases, of the seemingness of identity, is more primeval than the
cognition of identity” (WP 544). Truth, in synthesis – as already the small but excellently
written juvenile essay On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense14 warned – is but “[a] mobile
army  of  metaphors,  metonyms,  and  anthropomorphisms”  and  any  concept  is  but
“metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power” (p. 235).
14 The fulcrum of  the pragmatist  proposal  is  but a few steps away from the dangerous
Nietzschean “relativism,”15 and everything relies  –  like in Nietzsche – on the way of
looking at the terms “truth” and “reality”: “For rationalism reality is ready-made and
complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of
its complexion from the future” (P 123). Reality is not certain and static, out there, but “still
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pursuing its adventures” (ivi) and, as in a creative and artistic process, we add, with the
touch of our hands, the tint of colour that we prefer, the embossing that better seems to
us to model the clay of the world, aware that we “rape” (ivi), embank and orient the
sensible flux. Nietzsche thinks along exactly the same lines in On the Genealogy of Morals:
“interpretation  [is]  forcing,  adjusting,  abbreviating,  omitting,  padding,  inventing,
falsifying.”16
15 To interpret is to select some aspects that are significative for our vital practices, James
thinks. Thus the truth and rigour of our analysis does not descend from the capacity of
reading and describing correctly any aspect of the phenomenon that we have in front of
us (the that facing us), but it also depends on our purposes, interests, or points of view.
Which of these aspects we consider “real,” making it work as decisive in the conclusions of
our  reasoning,  becomes  a  function  of  the  interest  that  moves  us  towards  knowledge
(P 121). And, as Heidegger said, knowledge has an understanding-interpreting root and a
pathic-emotive root that are always entrenched. Thus, the analytical motto “[i]t is true
what can be demonstrated in a rigorous way” has already decided in favour of that very
precise value that is rigour (thus to be conceived as a pre-judice), it has already set itself
in  a  particular  emotive  situation,  ready  to  start  an  “interested”  understanding  that
defines objectivity, coherence, clarity, analyticity as unshakeable values. But if they have
value  –  both  Nietzsche  and  James  state  –  it  is  because  they  work  in  our  cognitive
practices,  in our scientific forms of  life,  not because they are absolute and universal
truths. When a theorem is analysed, order is certainly to be preferred to disorder. But
when we are in a relationship, the coherent asset of an ordered world, or the crystalline
domain of the rigour as reference parameters quickly fade away: there are no true and
fake  loves,  demonstrable  and  indemonstrable  ones.  Nietzsche  noticed  how  wisdom,
clarity and logic had been used as weapons against the ferociousness of instincts, from
Socrates to Stoics, and beyond. The request for greater “objectivity” and coherence, the
appeal to elaborate a disinterested theory, led by an imperturbable gaze, answers to a very
specific interest, with its undeniably emotive tone.
16 Logical  truths  reflect  their  own  eco-physiological  ground,  as  Babich  states;17 James’
concept of interest and Nietzsche’s concept of perspective have more than one point of
connection  and  I believe  that  we  can  proceed  along  these  lines  and  point  out  how
Nietzsche bluntly develops pragmatist  motives,  and how James could be defined as a
“perspectivist” in the sense that we have just sketched.
 
Truth as Belief
17 If – according to Nietzsche – being is identified with the value that we attribute to it,
according to pragmatists being is always what is believed to be the way it is: it coincides
thus with the opinion that is held of it, with the sign that indicates and nominates it.
Again the theme of truth is at stake and the shadow of Sophistics on the domain of our
logical concepts lengthens.
18 James – as we have seen – believes in a “genetic theory of what is meant by truth” (P 37):
truth is in the doing, it evolves in the course of experience, it is a process that is unfolded
in  time,  following  the  model  of  epigenesis,18 by  assimilation  and differentiation  (“a
minimum of  jolt,  a  maximum of  continuity”  P 36),  with  no  possibility  to  predict  its
outcomes. A true theory operates a “marriage-function” (P 37) between old and new parts
of knowledge, grafting itself into the old stem of knowledge and modifying its nodes.19
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19 But, above all, an idea or a theory can be defined as true, if it is of value as a useful tool for
action and for  life,  acting as  a  guide  and a  companion to  our  existence (P 34).  It  is
possible, I think, to sum up James’ thought – as expressed in the Pragmatism essays – in
this way: a belief counts as true when it satisfies us, it pays, also, in the cash-value of the
word, it  gratifies  us,  is  held as true,  proves itself  useful  if  considered true,  functions in
orienting us along the road of research, that is, is advantageous as related to our vital
power. “If there were no good for life in true ideas, or if the knowledge of them were
positively disadvantageous and false ideas the only useful ones, then the current notion
that truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, could never have grown up” (P 42,
emphasis  mine).  Thoughts  –  in  this  conception  –  are  simply  tools  “at-hand,”  work
instruments,  almost  a  prosthesis  of  our  vital  organs  that  support  the  thousands  of
practical and theoretical operations we are daily involved in. An idea will be “verified”
not when it agrees with an “external” object, but when it is able to put us “into such
working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if
we disagreed” (P 102). Truth is only an “expedient” (P 106) that guides us through reality,
and an experience that meets some experience in sight, and not necessarily will meet
farther experience equally satisfactorily. “The possession of truth, here so far from being
an end in itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital satisfactions” (P 98). The
line is not to be drawn between truth and lie, but between what is true (meaning what is
relevant to the active praxis) and what is irrelevant, which means unfit to guide me in the
world-environment, and thus to facilitate the elaboration of a certain project, producing
a state of calm and satisfaction.
20 James’ position is thus ethical (or bio-ethical); more, it proceeds in the direction that I
would ascribe to Nietzsche also, namely of an ethics of praxis: an idea can be considered
true when believing in it proves to be better,  that is more advantageous in our lives
(P 42). In this sense it is a good and just idea, and truth can be considered as a species of
good. But we are far from the Platonic horizon: true is the opinion that is held as true in a
certain historical period and for certain ends; true is the belief, the belief that has a value,
that more effectively circulates inside a community, as a banknote, and that is embraced
since it proves useful for the survival of the individual or of the species. Indeed, how to
separate what is better for us to believe and what we must believe? Is it not true – as
Peirce also stated – that logic is grounded on inherently ethical principles and it is rooted
on a social principle? That is – as Nietzsche wrote – is it not true that logic is structured as
such since it comes from a field that is not entirely logical?20
21 The blending of psychology and ethics that seems to pollute James’ epistemology has
been much criticised by those who ascribe themselves to the Peircean school of thought.
But on the contrary, this blending is maybe the strength of this epistemology. James’
insistence on affective and psychological themes is the same that was also present in
Nietzsche, when he declared himself a psychologist21 or when he suggested to investigate
the existence of  a prehistory of  “drives,  inclinations,  aversions” (GS 335)  behind any
judgement. Certainly James has never meant to advance a genealogy of morals,  or of
moral  prejudices;  and  he  has  never  used  any  idol-smasher  hammer.  Indeed,  any
philosopher has his own temper and his own weapons to fight the battle for truth.
22 Let us now put together what we have learned from James and what Nietzsche notices in
relation to the theme of truth as belief: indeed it is surprising to see how even the words
through which this hypothesis is presented – let alone their comments – are shared by
the two great thinkers.
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23 “[T]hat there should be a large amount of faith, that it should be possible to pass definite
judgments on things,  and that  there  should be  no  doubt  at  all  concerning all  essential
values. Thus it is necessary that something should be assumed to be true, not that it is 
true” (WP 507). If truth – as James clearly pointed out – is manufactured and not found,
the will to truth demands the act of making true, of holding as true, of acting as if it were
true. Indeed, will to truth – Nietzsche adds – is only a mask for will to power (that is then
primarily creative power). To believe is the primordial trait in any sensible impression, “a
sort of yea-saying” (WP 506); therefore the evaluation ‘I believe that this and this other is
this’ has to be considered as an exact indication of the “essence of truth” (WP 507). This
motive is present in the all of Nietzsche’s work: to the one who objects that for as much as
a thing is believed in, it does not become true, the answer is that truth is simply a form of
belief that is manifested as a non-eliminable condition of life, that is of an expansion of
one’s  own possibility of  action (WP 532-3).  The hypothesis  that  more than any other
instills  unto us a sense of  security and strength is  believed truer:  its  crystalline and
coherent appearance is simply a projection of our strengthened and acquiesced soul. As a
conclusion, the will to believe is nothing else than the will to power.
24 But which is the most valuable belief? It is the belief that something lasts and repeats
itself – the author thinks –, that sound bases on which to build “facts” and theories can be
individuated: that “logicising, rationalising, and systematising are of assistance as means
of existence” (WP 552) (James wrote “helpful” P 42). To believe makes stronger, apter to
life. “What is truth? - inertia; that hypothesis which brings satisfaction […]” (WP 537). True
is what resonates with a familiar tone and produces a pause in our questioning. The
irritation due to doubt – Peirce said – induces a struggle to achieve a state of belief,
something  which  represents  the  demi-cadence  that  closes  a  musical  phrase  in  the
symphony of our intellectual life. The only aim of the research is thus to establish an
opinion, not necessarily a true opinion, but a stable, reassuring one.22 To bring something
unknown back to something known “is comforting, reassuring, satisfying and produces a
feeling of power, as well” (TI VII.5): it is not Peirce here who speaks, but Nietzsche – and it
is only the word macht (power) that distinguishes him from the American thinkers. The
pleasure of familiarity is the proof of the value of truth, the author goes on. The unknown
produces indeed a sense of danger, of restlessness, and the first instinct is the one of
suppressing this distressing state of the soul: the need to rationalize is simply the need
for known things (this is the reason we always start from ourselves and in particular from
our supposed interiority [...]).  But then, “Is it  not the instinct to fear that bids us to
know?” (GS 355).
25 Here Nietzsche begins to weave his spider web around the cornerstone-propositions of
metaphysics: what if the issue was not knowledge, but power? And what if the search for
truth was not the point, but an impulse to dominate and control the existent was at stake
instead?  What  if  the  impulse  to  truth  should  be  considered  first  and  foremost
genealogically,  in  its  moral  and  psychological  aspects?  The  instinct  that  pushes  us
towards knowledge – Nietzsche writes in BGE 6 – is not the father of philosophy but only
one of its instruments: the inclination to expansion, domination, power, reassurance and
self-  preservation prevails  in thinking and constructing reasoning:  needs that  are all
human, too human. Let us start with always asking ourselves “how the most remote
metaphysical claims in a philosophy really arose […]: What moral is it (is he-) aiming at?”
(BGE  6).  Reading  the  first  essay  by  James  in  Pragmatism,  “The  Present  Dilemma  in
Nietzsche and James
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Philosophy,”  with  its  well-known distinction between tender-minded  and tough-minded 
souls, we will find a certain family resemblance (although not a sameness).
26 Concepts – Nietzsche realizes also – are only instruments “directed […] at the appropriation 
of things” (WP 503), the apparatus of knowledge a pure mechanism that performs a task.
“The object is not ‘to know,’ but to schematize, – to impose as much regularity and form
upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In the formation of reason, logic, and the
categories, it was a need in us that was the determining power: not the need ‘to know,’ but
to classify, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. […] No pre-
existing ‘idea’ had anything to do with it: but utility, which teaches us that things can be
reckoned with and managed, only when we view them roughly as equal […] Finality in
reason is an effect, not a cause […] The categories are ‘truths’ only in the sense that they
are the conditions of our existence, just as Euclid’s Space is a conditional ‘truth.’ […] [t]he
instinct which makes us see the utility of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood,
we are almost this instinct […] But what simplicity it is to attempt to derive a proof from
this fact!” (WP 515). Is Nietzsche speaking here or James? Certainly, the issues at stake
and the way of solving them are similar. I could go on quoting numerous aphorisms from
the same period, 1884-8823 especially. Maybe the most revealing aphorism for tracing the
identity of perspective of the two philosophers on this point is WP 514: the categories of
reason – Nietzsche writes – were able to become dominant because they were functional
to the survival even of the weakest ones. Their moral origin was forgotten, a sure sign of
the origin becoming “master.” Soon they were considered a priori. “And possibly, they
may have been the expression of no more than a certain practicality, answering the ends
of a race and species – their usefulness alone is their ‘truth’” (WP 514, emphasis mine).
 
Truth as Usefulness
27 We have thus reached the theme that most of all has motivated the connection between
the two authors in critical literature. We will see that if the – almost lexical – affinities are
truly surprising, their research directions differ in an unavoidable way. Nietzsche talks of
usefulness, advantage, value for life, in a way that certainly echoes James’ work (e.g.,
WP 507), but exactly what kind of utility is that? And is it possible to equate truth and
utility – an operation that for its apparent coarseness has provoked so many problems to
the exegetes of James?
28 First of all, let us clarify that in Nietzsche “useful” is a linguistic term and as such it is
metaphoric. Therefore it has to be determined in relation to a specific use, productive of
finalities  sometimes different  from the expected ones.  There are  different  species  of
usefulness, he writes in WP 647, in the aphorism titled “Against Darwinism,” and that
which is useful, for instance, to the duration of the individual, could be in fact damaging
to  its  strength  and  its  brightness.  The  usefulness  of  an  organ  does  not  explain  its
formation  –  as  Darwin  instead  claimed  –  on  the  contrary!  We  have  always  to  ask
ourselves: “Useful in relation to what?”
29 There is especially one point on which the thoughts of the two authors seem far removed
from one another. Let us read the aphorism 493: “Truth is that kind of error without which
a certain species of living being cannot exist. The value for Life is ultimately decisive.”
This is  the issue at  stake for Nietzsche:  if  it  is  true that  the value for life is  a  non-
transcendable principle (and life – it has to be reminded – means the expansion of the will
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to power, in this case the power of the body and its “great reason”), this value does not
necessarily coincide with what can be considered true logically, but it could also be error,
falsification, mask, pure appearance, deception. Since On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense
,  the author has  been arguing for  the irrelevance of  the questions connected to the
distinction true/false, referring them instead to the distinction advantage/disadvantage.
24 Thus  truth  –  as  Vahininger  would  write  –  can  simply  be  considered  as  the  most
advantageous form of error. As a consequence, error can also appear as truth in itself, it is
sufficient that it proves to be useful to somebody for something.25 “[A belief] might be a
life-preserving belief and still be false” (WP 483). James certainly did not take this road.
Although, if we read his writings carefully, it would be possible to infer a connection also
at this level:  indeed James moved beyond the distinction true/false, as we have seen,
embracing the relevant (for somebody’s interests)/ irrelevant one.
30 Anyway Nietzsche dares in an even more profound theoretical maelstrom: the falsity of
judgment  does  not  stand  as  an  objection  to  it  (BGE 4);  on  the  contrary,  without  a
perennial action of falsification – that is of metaphorisation of the existing that, as we
have seen, is accomplished by logic and science, as well as by art and life, according to
Nietzsche – it would not be possible to live. “We have arranged for ourselves a world in
which we are able to live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion
and rest, form and content, without these articles of faith no one could endure living! But
that does not prove them true.  Life is  not an argument;  the conditions of  life might
include  error”  (GS 121).  To  renounce  to  the  creative  exercise  that  weaves  colourful
mantles and repainted surfaces, an exercise that stays on the surface, in order not to see
the depth of the cave on which we stand, that would mean to renounce to life: life wants
errors,  errors  are  a  condition  of  life  itself.  Against  the  morality  of  reasonable
utilitarianism,  Nietzsche  deploys  the  Apolonnian  power  of  lies  and  their  beautiful
appearances. If life is becoming, then knowledge is impossible, since it changes meaning as
soon as it is constituted, since it becomes error as soon as it is attested as being (WP 617)
“To  concede  the  fictional  nature  of  the  condition  of  life  means  of  course  taking  a
dangerous stand against the customary feelings about value. A philosophy which dares to
do that is for this reason alone already standing beyond good and evil” (BGE 4).
31 Let us reconnect the threads of discussion without delving further in the complex theme
of truth in Nietzsche, a theme that would require a much wider treatment. According to
Nietzsche – as well as to James (and Peirce) – the “feeling of rationality” coincides with a
state of rest of the thought, with an inertial state – we can say – in which the fear for the
unknown is acquiesced and the faith in one’s own certainties helps to survive without
falling into the abyss of nihilism or scepticism. According to pragmatists, this process is
not only necessary from a biological and epistemological point of view, but it is also an
index of intellectual superiority. According to Nietzsche it has certainly played a role –
for instance – in the edification of the knowledge of science and metaphysics, where logic
has proved to be a successful expedient to conduct a more prosperous and protected life.
If the aim is “value for life,” to talk of substance, subject, principle of non contradiction,
sufficient  reason,  or  causality,  everything  works  perfectly,  as  long  as  it  succeeds  in
granting strength to the ascending life, that life which does not accept to be petrified in a
“pigeon-hole” of concepts. It is necessary, though, to be aware that it works because it is a
work  of  fiction.  That  any  interpretation  (thus  also  logical,  dialectical,  metaphysical
interpretations) is counterfeiting, a “fake,” a “substitute” (P 120). In these statements,
apparently similar, the distance between the two authors can be measured: according to
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James, a “substitute” is a creation that “stands for” something that, although existing, we
will never be able to grasp; according to Nietzsche this “something” is a nothing at all: we
find “[b]ehind every cave an even deeper cavern” (BGE 289); “we no longer believe that
truth remains truth when one pulls off the veil” states the preface to the second edition
of the Gay Science.
32 Usefulness should not thus be seen as a value in itself, as an indisputable consequence of
the truth of being – as it seems to be in James – but as a function of the will to power, that
is, in conclusion, as one of its masks. If truth coincides with usefulness, usefulness has a
purely illusory character:  it  serves the constant lie with which life constantly moves
beyond itself translating itself into power. Thus, paradoxically, also the idea of truth as
correspondence to a reality in itself (adaequatio) can be useful for a certain period and for
certain purposes. The important thing is that it be productive of a functional perspective, in
other words that it is able to deceive us on our ability to dominate. Also in Nietzsche
there is – all in all – a non-transcendable value: sure not the value of usefulness but of life
that wants to expand itself. And life is ready, in order to gain more power, to immolate
itself, in other words not to be useful to itself anymore.
33 Truth in conclusion is always the effect of a (winning) praxis. There is no truth in itself,
there  are  variegated  and  multiform  effects  of  truth.  If  this  is  the  keystone  of  the
pragmatist investigation,26 also in Nietzsche we find sparse, but robust, references to the
praxeologic dimension of knowledge. The prevailing of perspectivism, indeed, should not
be interpreted as a sheer primacy of the intellectual point of view; on the contrary, it has
an “empiricist” meaning in the Jamesian sense: “A higher duty is to fix a goal and to mould
facts according to it: that is, the interpretation of action, and not merely a transvaluation of
concepts” (WP 605). We introduce a sense, we produce it, we create it. But not arbitrarily
or intellectually: with our actions and their sensitive effects. The perspective is nothing
else than the praxis,  the form of life to which we are anchored (even in a biological
sense), a praxis that implies the selection of features crucial in modifying the very same
experiential  terrain  in  which  we  enact  this  praxis.  But  saying  that  the  perspective
coincides with the praxis  that  we enact,  with the infinite habits  of  reaction through
which  we  trade  with  the  world,  we  have  asserted  again,  without  any  coercion,  the
connection between hermeneutics and pragmatism, between interpretation and action.
Any perspective is  first of  all  embodied in a  way of  action:  “the deed –  the deed is
everything,”27 and there is no legitimacy in thinking any subject as added to the event of
the action, any being under the doing. “The interpretation of causality is an illusion […] A
‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by means of a concept, an image”
(WP 551).28 It is not difficult for those who know not only James but also Peirce to see,
shining through this aphorism, a sketch of the pragmatic maxim: our idea of anything is
the idea of its sensible effects, and any thought is translated into an action. Moreover,
Nietzsche insists on pointing out the need to abandon “the faith in origin” and in the
intention of the author, in order to consider the “backward working power” of success or
failure of an enterprise, that is of its consequences as values of the action itself (BGE 32).29
34 But if to land in a belief means to perform a habit of reaction – as Peirce claimed – to this
habit we adhere, welcoming it as if it were an instinct. Better, as if it were a faith. I will
choose two aphorisms that I consider particularly significative of the pragmatic tonality
of the author:  they are written at  15 years of  distance,  as a testimony of  Nietzsche’s
persistent inclination towards this plan of analysis. In 1872 he writes: “[Life] needs faith
in truth, but in that case illusion is sufficient, that is ‘truths’ are demonstrated through
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their effects, not through logical demonstrations […] What is true and what exercises an
action is considered as identical.”30 In the summer of 1887, close to his psychological
collapse, Nietzsche questions himself again on the real genesis of concepts and says: “this
springs  from  practical  spheres,  from  utilitarian  spheres,  hence  the  strong  faith  it
commands (one is threatened with ruin if one’s conclusions are not in conformity with this
reason; but this fact is no “proof” of what the latter asserts)” (WP 579).
 
Truth as Faith
35 Let us then – in the end – consider maybe the most divulgative and popular text by James,
the Will to believe. I will briefly synthesize the theses argued for in it, emphasizing the
elements that – in my opinion – are most strongly echoed in Nietzsche. First of all, James
claims that we adhere to a hypothesis, even in scientific domains, when we can make it
come alive with the sap of our interest, an interest which has always a passional nature.
According to the nice example by the author, if I refer to the Islamic Messiah, the Mahdi,
this kind of idea does not induce in my listeners any significative reaction; instead in an
Arab, it turns out to be a lively hypothesis that can lead him to move mountains: the
value of an idea is attested by the “willingness to act,” and the “faith” in it is embodied in
the immediate and irrevocable action that follows from it. Any belief, in conclusion, has a
fideistic component that ignites it and enables its perpetration. And this faith, or will to
believe, is pragmatically will to act. A hypothesis that is not made alive by an active,
favourite, passional – inherently pre-judiced, we could say – choice is a dead hypothesis,
and consequently it has to be admitted that the emotional sphere is not at all extraneous
to intellectual knowledge: actually it nourishes it and it enables it to hold, in many cases,
those aspects of ‘objectivity’ and rigour that – as we have already noticed – are nothing
else than specific emotive tonalities. Intellectual knowledge is not “what remains after
wish and will and sentimental preference have taken wing” (WB 8), but, lived as a belief
in truth, it answers to a deep need of our being. The non-intellectual nature of all our
convictions is absolutely determining in making knowledge itself emerge and circulate.
36 Truth, far from being evidence, is not only a pure perspectival belief, it is also configured
as an act of faith that expresses a deep desire of a pathic nature. We need truth, that is,
we  need  to  believe  in  order  to  act.  Before  knowing,  there  is  the  need  to  know,  an
absolutely vital need. And, is there any difference – James asks – between faith in God and
faith in science? Maybe not that much, since they are all faiths, although of different
character,  unshakeable  faiths  that  each  of  us  embraces  according to  his  own
temperament.  In  this  hall,  the  conference  speaker  reminds  us,  each  of  us  blindly
“believes” in the (admittedly invisible) presence of molecules and cells, he believes in
those “things” that are democracy and progress [...] But are they facts or interpretations?
37 “Pure knowledge and pure logic” do not produce in themselves our beliefs which have an
invariably passional nature: “our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth
and that our minds and it are made for each other, – what is [this] but a passionate
affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs up?” (WB 9). Nietzsche seems to
echo James: “But this involves prejudice, it is a sign that truth does not enter the question
at all […] But what was needed was always belief – and not truth” (WP 455). Science itself
reveals its ethical foundation when it establishes that the unceasing evaluation of facts
and the corrections of the false beliefs are the supreme goods for the human being. The
same insistence on pure logic,  purified  from any feeling,  betrays  that  the absence of
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sentimentalism shares the same sentimental nature of the sentimentalism that it would
want to be rid of.
38 It is thus in this plot of emotions, passions, capacities of affection, practical impulses and
vital  needs  that  intellectual  reflection  emerges.  They  prove  to  be  dynamo-genic
principles – as the author writes in other passages.31 And if “the faith in a fact can help
create the fact” (WB 25) – that is, if any fact is declined as a value – the will to believe
proves to be the will to power, that is the will to creative action, also for James.
39 Significantly, Nietzsche titled one of his most famous aphorisms “In what way we, too, are
pious” (GS 344) and in its incipit it stages the same arguments as The Will to Believe by
James. Science – they say – grants no right to citizenship to convictions; yet, it has to
begin when the field has been emptied of any personal and passional conviction. Probably
this is said with good reason – the author glosses – but we still have to ask ourselves if, “in
order that this cultivation begin, must there not be some prior conviction – and indeed one
so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself?” Thus,
even “science rests on a belief,” and there is no science or knowledge completely empty
of assumptions.32 The question if truth is necessary has an answer that is antecedent any
other research and any other intellectual inquire, and this is exactly because it points out a
need of a very different nature: the faith “that nothing is more needed than truth.” As
James claimed, also the scientist is a believer and one not very open to doubt.
40 Up until now – as easily noticed – the words of the two authors echo each other in tones,
in arguments and even in lexicon. It is not possible to live without believing, it is not
possible to live completely “sceptically,” that is it is not possible to live without thinking
that there is the (a) truth. We adhere to the perspective in which we believe as we adhere
to our skin: to us it is the truth, and we are faithful to it. If true is “to hold true,” it is also
to want to hold as true, that is “to hold to it.”
41 But then Nietzsche hits deeper with his hammer and asks: What does this unconditional
will to truth hide? The will to not let oneself be deceived? The will to not deceive? The
will to not deceive myself? And what is the feeling that shines through, here, what is the
advantage, for life, that inspires such an impulse? Why in the end avoid deception? How
many times  in  the course  of  life,  of  the individual  and of  the species,  have we had
demonstrations  that  deception  serves  life,  more  than  truth  itself?  It  is  not  thus  a
utilitarian calculation. And then why are we always speaking of things being true, good,
fair, what is this a symptom of? It is not at all an epistemic, but a moral issue: “‘Will to
truth’ does not mean ‘I do not want to let myself be deceived’ but – there is no alternative
– ‘I will not deceive, not even myself’: and with this we stand on moral ground” (GS 344). A
morality that conceals an unconscious will  to death, because life is polytropos,  varied,
ambiguous, contradictory, deceiving. The man of truth is – in other words – the man of
nihilism, the man that stiffens his own concepts – out of fear for becoming – until he
makes them lifeless. Hypotheses – as James would have said – go from alive to dead. There
is but one conclusion: “even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still
take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith
which was also Plato’s faith, that God, that truth is divine […] But what if this were to
become more and more difficult to believe, if nothing more were to turn out to be divine
except error, blindness, the lie – if God himself were to turn out to be our longest lie?”
(ivi).
42 Behind the will to believe the face that the mask of certainty conceals unveils: the will not
to believe, the will of illusion, even the will of deception.
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43 Certainly  James  does  not  reach  this  point.  He  does  not  reach  it  because  truth  –  as
perspectival as it can be – always appears and stays at the centre of his research (cp. WB
ch. 5), because he is a self-proclaimed empiricist who “preserves as cordial a relation with
facts” (P 26) and, especially, since to refuse the hypothesis of God and of a metaphysical
hope was impossible to him, a religious man, and moreover an optimistically hopeful man
in the progress of humanity towards the better.33 Sometimes, however – as pragmatism
itself teaches us – the finalities that one sets upon oneself do not coincide with the effects
that  are  produced.  In  James’  theses,  in  his  refined  and  at  the  same  time  popular
intellectual constructions, in the problems that he was able to spot, the themes of the
coming new age were blossoming, first and foremost the one that Nietzsche summed up
with the words “death of God”: the loss of any value and any certainty, but, at the same
time, the birth of “philosophers of the dangerous Perhaps” (BGE 2), that will be able to
avoid the mermaids of the will to believe.
44 I  would  conclude  with  a last,  beautiful  quotation  by  Nietzsche,  taken  from  On  the
Genealogy of Morals, that synthesizes a great deal of his thought, at least as regards the
themes that I have sketched here, and through which he – at the same time – seems to
hold his  hand out to James and to his  last  theoretical  proposals:  “From now on,  my
philosophical  gentlemen,  let  us  protect  ourselves  better  from  the  dangerous  old
conceptual fantasy which posits a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of cognition,’
let’s guard ourselves against the tentacles of such contradictory ideas as ‘pure reason,’
‘absolute spirituality,’ ‘knowledge in itself’ – those things which demand that we imagine
an eye which simply can’t be imagined, an eye without any direction at all, in which the
active and interpretative forces are supposed to stop or be absent – the very things
through which seeing first becomes seeing something. Hence these things always demand
from the eye something conceptually empty and absurd. The only seeing we have is seeing
from a perspective; the only knowledge we have is knowledge from a perspective. The
more emotional affects we allow to be expressed in words concerning something, the more
eyes,  different eyes, we know how to train on the same thing, the more complete our
“idea” of this thing, our “objectivity,” will be. But to eliminate the will in general, to
suspend all our emotions without exception – even if we were capable of that – what
would that be? Wouldn’t we call that castrating the intellect? […].”34
NOTES
1. From the beginning already I should like to make this clear: to compare Nietzsche and James is
not  only  a  theoretical  proposal,  but  it  also  seems to  be  a  sound historiographical  direction:
indeed, both the authors were enthusiastic readers of Emerson, from whom in many cases they
both  drew  inspiration.  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson  seems  to  be  the  root  of  the  crenulated
developments of a great part of pragmatism and – via Nietzsche – of a significant quantity of
studies in the “continental” field. More work should be done – in my opinion – on this shared
root. On the contrary, James knew little of Nietzsche. He had read some of his writings, since
Nietzsche  was  mentioned  in  Harvard  (Royce  introduced  Nietzsche  to  the  North  American
academic world, with more appreciation of and attention to the German philosopher than James
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ever paid). Anyway, James’ critique of Nietzsche’s positions is very radical, while being restricted
to certain pages of The Varieties of Religious Experience, where the themes related to ascetic moral,
force  and therefore  anti-democraticity  of  Nietzsche emerge.  The critical  texts  that  treat  the
relations  between  the  two  authors  are  –  to  my  knowledge  –  very  few.  Besides  the  already
mentioned Rorty, who refers to Nietzsche and James specifically in Consequences of Pragmatism,
Minnesota University Press, 1982 and in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge University
Press, 1989; we can refer to Hingst Kai-Michael, Perspektivism und Pragmatismus. Ein Vergleich auf
der Grundlage der Warheitsbegriffe  und Religionsphilosphien von Nietzsche und James,  1998.  In Italy
Sergio Franzese is the main investigator: cp. Nietzsche e l’America, edited by S. Franzese, ETS, Pisa,
2005, with an essay by Franzese on James lettore di Nietzsche,  themes further elaborated in The
Ethics of Energy, Ontos verlag, Frankfurt, 2008. However we should not forget the first pioneering
researches by R. Berthelot. (Un romantisme utilitaire. Le pragmatisme chez Nietzsche e chez Poincaré,
Alcan, Paris 1911), by J. Granier, (Le probléme de la verité chez Nietzsche, Seuil, Paris, 1966) and by W.
Kaufmann, who hinted at this in his Nietzsche. Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton UP,
Princeton, 1968.
2. I have recently written about the relations between two other great representatives of these
traditions, Peirce and Heidegger, in Ermeneutica e pragmatismo, CUEM, Milano, 2009. On these two
authors cp. also C. Sini, Passare il segno, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1981.
3. I quote from F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power. An attempted transvaluation of all values. Books one,
two, three and four, in Oscar Levy, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, 14-5. Edinburgh and
London, T.N. Foulis, (Revised third edition 1925, published by The Macmillan Company), from
now on WP followed by the number of the pseudo-aphorism.
4. I quote from W. James, Pragmatism. A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking, in Pragmatism and
The Meaning of Truth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1978, from now on P followed by the
page number.
5. Indeed, it is to be remembered that these are notes and sketches of thoughts that Nietzsche
wrote for personal use and not for publication.
6. This example is “stolen” from Deleuze.
7. J.von Uexküll (1938), Theoretische Biologie, Berlin, p. 340-1, 121-2; my translation.
8. Cp. A. Orsucci (1992), Dalla biologia cellulare alle scienze dello spirito, Bologna, Il Mulino; F. Moiso
(1993),  La  volontà  di  potenza  di  F.  Nietzsche.  Una  riconsiderazione,  in  ‘Aut  Aut’,  253,  p. 119-36;
B. Babich (1994), Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Science, State University of New York; W. Müller-Lauter
(1998), Physiologie de la volonté de puissance, Paris, Allia; F. Moiso (1999), Nietzsche e le scienze, Cuem,
Milano; M. Ferraris (1999), Ontologia, in Nietzsche, Laterza, Roma-Bari; B. Stiegler (2001), Nietzsche
et la biologie,  Paris, PUF, (now in a new Italian translation, Negretto, Mantova, 2009, ed. by R.
Fabbrichesi e F. Leoni).
9. Cp. On these topics C. Sini (2009), Da parte a parte. Apologia del relativo, ETS, Pisa.
10. H. Bergson (1911), Préface à W. James, Pragmatisme, Flammarion, Paris; now in La pensée et le
mouvant, Paris, Alcan, (1934), “Sur le pragmatisme de James. Vérité et réalité”, p. 275.
11. The author writes here: “In short: the essence of a thing is really only an opinion concerning
that ‘thing.’ Or, better still; ‘it is worth’ is actually what is meant by ‘it is,’ or by ‘that is’.” (WP 556).
12. Cp. for instance Eracle al bivio. Semiotica e filosofia, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2007.
13. F. Nietzsche,  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  translated  by  Judith  Norman and edited  by  Rolf-Peter
Horstmann,  Cambridge,  Cambridge University Press,  2002;  from now on BGE followed by the
number of the aphorism. In aphorism 598 from WP we can read – very significantly: “The belief
that there is no such thing as truth, the Nihilistic belief, is a tremendous relaxation for one who, as a
warrior of knowledge, is unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is ugly.”
Thus for Nietzsche truth exists: it is the Dionysian ground of existence (cp. also BGE 143: the
terrifying basic text of homo natura). But it is – evidently – an existence that is not existent, an
endless falling of masks
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14. 1873, Friedrich Nietzsche. “On Truth and Lies in an Nonmoral Sense,” in Philosophy and Truth:
Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, ed. and trans. David Breazeale, New Jersey,
Humanities Press, 1979.
15. Cp  on  this  point  C. H. Seigfried,  William  James’s  Radical  Reconstruction  of  Philosophy,  State
University of New York Press, 1990.
16. F. Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morals,  trans. Walter Kaufmann, NY, Vintage Books, 1967,
sezione III, 24.
17. B. Babich, op. cit., Cap. I.
18. I have developed further this aspect of James’ philosophy in its relation to Darwin in “Effetti
di verità: la rivoluzione darwiniana e il suo impatto sul pragmatismo,” Discipline filosofiche, 2009.
19. A theme that we found repeated in many passages in Nietzsche’s notes, also. Cp. WP 499:
“‘Thinking’ in a primitive (inorganic) state is to persevere in forms as in the case of the crystal. In
out thought, the essential factor is the harmonizing of the new material with the old schemes (=
Procustes’ bed), the assimilation of the unfamiliar.” The Darwinian influence on the two authors,
in these passages, is evident (Chauncey Wright will insist exactly on this point, anticipating that
exaptation that is so much talked about these days).
20. F.  Nietzsche,  The  Gay  Science,  trans.  J.  Nauckhoff,  Cambridge  (Ma),  Cambridge  University
Press,  2001,  § 111;  from  now  on  GS  followed by  the  aphorism  number.  “The  predominant
disposition [...]  to treat the similar as identical  – an illogical  disposition for there is  nothing
identical as such – is what first supplied all the foundations for logic.” And that was the case of
the construction of the concept of substance, or of causality, also. “No living being would be
preserved had not the opposite disposition – to affirm rather than suspend judgement, to err
rather than wait, to agree rather than deny, to pass judgement rather than be fair.
21. Cp. The Prefaction by Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idol, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, London,
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